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ABSTRACT: Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations 
in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 
2013) and Dokic and Engel (Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to de-
fend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly 
decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended 
possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles 
undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn’s.
Keywords: success semantics; naturalistic theories of content; mental representation; Frank Ramsey; teleosemantics.
RESUMEN: La Semántica del Éxito es una teoría del contenido que caracteriza las condiciones de verdad de las represen-
taciones mentales en términos de las condiciones de éxito de las acciones que se derivan de ellas. Nanay (Philos 
Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) y Dokic y Engel (Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) han revisado esta teo-
ría para defenderla de objeciones que socavaban sus formulaciones previas. Aquí argumento que ambas propues-
tas se enfrentan a dificultades decisivas. Más específicamente, estas versiones revisadas de la teoría no responden 
satisfactoriamente al problema planteado por la posible existencia de un número indefinido de obstáculos im-
previstos para el éxito de nuestras acciones. En el artículo sugiero que la posible presencia de obstáculos ignora-
dos supone un problema general para la Semántica del Éxito, incluyendo formulaciones alternativas como la de 
Blackburn.
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Introduction
Success semantics is a theory of mental content that accounts for the truth-conditions of 
beliefs in terms of the success-conditions of the actions elicited by such beliefs (Ramsey 
1927; Whyte 1990, 1997; Dokic and Engel 2003, 2005; Blackburn 2010, ch. 10; Nanay 
2013). Building on pragmatist themes, success semantics highlights important connections 
between belief and action. One reason why this project is attractive is that it seems to pave 
the way for a naturalistic account of mental content. In addition, it offers a plausible char-
acterization of the content of mental representations in non-linguistic animals (Ramsey 
1927; Nanay 2013).
However, despite its initial attractiveness, success semantics faces several difficulties. In 
particular, the possibility of unforeseen obstacles muddles the link between the success-con-
ditions of actions and the truth-conditions of the beliefs leading to them (Brandom 1994): 
an action based only on true beliefs may fail due to the presence of ignored obstacles. To 
my knowledge, the problem of ignored obstacles has not yet been satisfactorily addressed. 
In this paper, I discuss this problem and critically examine recent proposed solutions. I first 
present an objection to Dokic and Engel’s (2003) attempt to overcome the problem (sec-
tion 3). Then, in section 4, I argue that the open-ended possibility of impediments for our 
actions puts success semantics theories in general under pressure, even if it were granted 
that agents somehow have representations ruling out the presence of obstacles. In the last 
part of the paper I claim that this issue also has problematic consequences for revised ver-
sions of success semantics that, at first sight, could seem to remain unaffected by it, in par-
ticular Blackburn’s (section 5) and Nanay’s (section 6).
1. Success Semantics and Ignored Obstacles
Standard versions of success semantics revolve around what Dokic and Engel call ‘Ramsey’s 
Principle’ (Dokic and Engel 2003, 46):1
Ramsey’s Principle (RP): A belief’s truth conditions are those that guarantee the success of 
an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires.2
The idea underwriting RP is that when a belief is true, the actions derived from it will find 
success. For instance, the belief that there is water in the flask will lead me to drink from it, 
in order to quench my thirst. If my belief is actually true, and there is water in the flask, I 
will succeed in quenching my thirst; however, if my belief was false and the flask was empty, 
it is most likely that I will fail.
1 This sort of principle had been previously formulated by Whyte (1990, 150), who attributes it to Ram-
sey (1927, 159).
2 I will assume that the content of beliefs can be characterized as a proposition determining a set of pos-
sible worlds (i.e. the condition in which the belief is true). This assumption is shared by the defend-
ers of success semantics I will engage with. Due to space constraints, I leave aside the interesting ques-
tion of how success semantics would fare if we characterized beliefs in a different way, for instance as 
a probability distribution over possible situations (when discussing Nanay’s view, however, I will criti-
cize certain probabilistic reformulations of success semantics). 
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RP faces several objections. In particular, contrary to what RP states, truth does not 
seem to be sufficient for success (Brandom 1994; Blackburn 2010; Nanay 2013).3 One first 
problem is that a true belief accompanied by false collateral beliefs may lead to practical fail-
ure. The standard way of overcoming this difficulty is to say that the success-conditions of 
an action give us the truth-conditions of the set of beliefs that combine to produce that ac-
tion (Whyte 1990; Dokic and Engel 2003; Brandom 1994; Blackburn 2010). One would 
then derive the truth-conditions of individual beliefs by contrasting the truth-conditions 
of all the sets in which the individual belief is involved: ‘The truth conditions of the belief 
is the invariant of all the truth conditions of all the sets to which it belongs’ (Dokic and En-
gel 2003, 49).
Let us grant that the problem of false collateral beliefs can be solved in this way. I will 
focus on a further difficulty: even when all the beliefs leading to some action are true, the 
action may still fail. The reason for this is that ignored obstacles or impediments may 
thwart the success of actions, even if such actions were based only on true beliefs (Brandom 
1994; Blackburn 2010). Imagine, for instance, that I truthfully believe that I poured water 
in my flask; I may still fail in quenching my thirst by drinking from the flask, if I am una-
ware that there is a hole in it.
Thus, an action may fail without any falsity in the agent’s beliefs, contrary to RP. The 
defender of success semantics would have to show that ignorance amounts to some sort of 
false belief. Perhaps it can be argued that when I intend to drink from the flask in order to 
quench my thirst, I have the belief that there are no holes in the flask. If this were the case, 
when as a matter of fact there are holes, one of my beliefs would turn out to be false, so RP 
would be able to account for the failure of my action. The problem is that, at least accord-
ing to Brandom (1994, 177), typically there are an indefinitely large number of possible ig-
nored obstacles for the success of our actions. Maybe the cap of the flask is stuck; or there 
is some substance inside that makes the water undrinkable. It seems that with a bit of im-
agination one will always be able to find new ways in which actions may fail due to ignored 
facts. I will assume that this is in general the case.
Given the assumption that there are an indefinitely large number of possible obsta-
cles, Brandom (1994, 177) claims that it is implausible to think that agents have beliefs 
about each and all of them. Certainly, on the face of it such a demand does not seem real-
istic: it would be too cognitively burdening, at least if these beliefs are taken to be explicit 
or actually formed by agents (Dokic and Engel 2003, 65; also Perry 1993, 202). The prob-
lem is not only that the number of required beliefs is indefinitely large, but also that many 
of those beliefs will be rather bizarre and convoluted, and are not likely to have ever crossed 
the agent’s mind (think of beliefs about the possibility of evil wizards casting defeating 
spells).
However, even if it is implausible to attribute to agents explicit beliefs about the ab-
sence of each possible obstacle, perhaps it is possible to ascribe to them some type of im-
3 Truth is not necessary for success, either. There may be lucky cases of successful actions based on false 
beliefs (for instance, I may succeed in catching the 4 o’clock train to London despite my falsely believ-
ing that it sets off at 5 o’clock, if at the same time my watch is one hour fast). Both Whyte (1997) and 
Dokic and Engel (2003, 48) claim that the truth of a belief is however necessary for the success of the 
totality of the possible actions following from it. I set this issue aside, as I will concentrate on criticizing 
the claim that truth is sufficient for success.
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plicit no-obstacle belief. In the next section I discuss a proposal of this sort, made by Dokic 
and Engel (2003). After discussing the problems faced by their view, in section 4 I put for-
ward a more general objection against the idea of rescuing success semantics by appeal to 
(implicit or explicit) auxiliary no-obstacles beliefs.
2. Dokic and Engel’s Proposal
Dokic and Engel agree that having explicit beliefs about the absence of each possible obsta-
cle would be too demanding. Nevertheless, they argue that such beliefs may be implicit in 
an agent who successfully performs an action. They work with the following notion of im-
plicit belief:
According to our definition, an implicit belief that p is a belief which has not to be considered 
by the agent, for instance in the form of a judgement that p, although the agent would be immedi-
ately justified if she were to make such a judgement on the basis of her experience. (2003, 68)
Dokic and Engel derive this notion of implicit belief from debates in epistemology. Ac-
cording to the epistemological view they are interested in, knowing that p puts the knower 
in a position to know that none of the possible impediments for the acquisitions of such 
knowledge is taking place. In this sense, the knower has implicit knowledge of the absence 
of all those possible impediments. So, my perceptual knowledge that it is raining puts me in 
a position to know that I am not dreaming, or that there is not a screen in front of me with 
fake rain. In accordance with this idea, Dokic and Engel propose the following principle of 
epistemic closure (PEC):
PEC: If I know that p, and q implies that I do not, I at least implicitly know that q is not the 
case. (2003, 71)
Now, the notion of implicit knowledge proposed by Dokic and Engel is controversial, and 
not without problems.4 However, let us accept it, for the sake of argument, and see now 
how it may be of help for success semantics.
Dokic and Engel (2003) think that an analogous notion of implicit knowledge may be 
found in the case of rational agency. According to this proposal, my successful performance 
of an action puts me in a position to acquire knowledge that none of the impediment for 
the success of such an action has taken place. So, my successful action of drinking from the 
flask puts me in a position to know that the cap was not stuck. This does not mean that I 
have to form such a belief in order to be able to perform the action; rather, the idea is that, 
were I to form such belief, I would be justified in doing so by my experience of success-
fully performing the action. In this sense, Dokic and Engel would argue that, when drink-
4 Note that agents could have this sort of implicit knowledge about things that have never crossed their 
minds, and that maybe they cannot even conceptualize.
 At the very least, it seems that it would be better to call this knowledge ‘accessible’, rather than im-
plicit. Such knowledge would be accessible in the sense that, according to Dokic and Engel, the agent 
would be in a position to acquire it: it would be knowledge available to the agent. 
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 5-22
 Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics 9
ing from the flask, I have implicit knowledge (thereby, an implicit belief) that the cap is not 
stuck (and also that there are no holes in the flask, that its mouth is not blocked etc.). The 
relevant principle of pragmatic closure (PPC) is, according to Dokic and Engel, the follow-
ing:
PPC: If I am intentionally doing p, and q implies that I cannot succeed, I at least implicitly 
know that q is not the case. (2003, 72)
Again, let me grant that this sort of implicit belief may be attributed to agents. Even if this 
is so, such implicit beliefs would not rescue success semantics from the problem of ignored 
obstacles. The reason for this is that the sort of implicit belief Dokic and Engel characterize 
may only be attributed to agents in cases of successful performance of an action—remember 
that it was such success that entitled the agent to form the different particular no-obsta-
cles beliefs.5 However, RP will only be saved if these implicit beliefs can be attributed also 
in cases of failure due to some obstacle. The problem for RP was that when an ignored ob-
stacle is present, the agent’s action may fail even if all her beliefs were true: the truth of her 
beliefs would not guarantee the success of the ensuing action. So, cases of failure due to ig-
nored obstacles will be counter-examples to RP unless it can be shown that the agent, after 
all, had some false belief. Given that, by assumption, all the agent’s explicit beliefs are true, 
the defender of RP needs to argue that the failure of the action can be blamed on the falsity 
of an implicit belief about the absence of the obstacle. If there were such false no-obstacle 
beliefs, RP would correctly allow for the failure of the action—since the agent, after all, had 
some false belief. But Dokic and Engel cannot argue that agents have the various no-obsta-
cle beliefs when the action fails, not even in an implicit way. The no-obstacle beliefs cannot 
be inferred from the failure of the action, so they would not be implicit—in the sense of 
implicit favored by Dokic and Engel—when the agent’s actions fail. On the contrary, the 
failure of the action would at best entitle the belief that there was some impediment (which 
would be a true belief).
Dokic and Engel’s proposal, therefore, does not show that agents have some false be-
lief whenever their actions fail due to the presence of ignored obstacles. From my failure in 
drinking I cannot infer that there were no holes in the flask, and therefore, I cannot appeal 
to the falsity of such implicit belief in order to explain the failure of my action. What suc-
cess semantics needs, rather than implicit knowledge, is implicit false beliefs, and this is not 
offered by Dokic and Engel’s proposal.
Perhaps Dokic and Engel may reply that they only wanted to show that, when the 
agent has all the relevant beliefs —or at least is in a position to form them with justifica-
tion—, the success of her action is guaranteed. But, what would happen then with the cases 
of practical failure due to ignored facts? In these cases, it would seem that there is no good 
reason for attributing any false belief to the agent, and nonetheless her action fails. Dokic 
and Engel, therefore, are just not addressing the problem of ignorance—and, thereby, they 
cannot defend the view that truth guarantees success.
5 Dokic and Engel explicitly claim that in PPC, ‘the phrase “doing p” is used to imply success’ (2003, 
72).
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3. The Holism of Success-Conditions
I have just shown that Dokic and Engel’s appeal to analogies between successful action and 
knowledge fails to show that agents have the sort of implicit belief discarding possible ob-
stacles that would vindicate RP. Now I want to argue that, even if it were accepted that 
agents have representations ruling out each possible obstacle, success semantics would still 
be in difficulties. In the last part of the paper, I will claim that such difficulties burden as 
well the alternative versions of success semantics proposed by Blackburn (2010) and Nanay 
(2013).
Dokic and Engel suggest that, at least in some basic cases, agents perceive possibilities 
for action (i.e. affordances) in their environment, and that such perceptual representations 
would be false if the relevant actions failed (2003, 66-69).6 For instance, when I reach for 
the glass in order to drink from it, I perceive the glass as affording my drinking from it (i.e. 
as affording drinkability). The accuracy of this perceptual representation would be incom-
patible with the presence of obstacles such as the glass being stuck to the table or its con-
tents being too hot.
It seems that these sorts of representations could be attributed to agents independently 
of Dokic and Engel’s proposed relation between implicit beliefs and successful actions, dis-
cussed above. One may wonder, thus, whether it is plausible to apply this idea across the 
board and claim that agents generally have representations (perhaps merely dispositional or 
implicit in some weak sense) ruling out the presence of each possible obstacle for the suc-
cess of the action performed.
For the sake of argument, let us grant that this suggestion is plausible.7 If these no-ob-
stacle (implicit) representations are added to RP, success semantics would seem to avoid 
the problem of ignored impediments: RP could be reformulated so that it claimed that the 
success of an action is guaranteed by the truth of all the representations eliciting it (includ-
ing the relevant no-obstacles implicit representations). The success-conditions of an action 
would determine the truth conditions of the conjunction of all these representations.
There are different ways of fleshing out these no-obstacles representations. On the 
one hand, there could be an indefinitely large number of specific representations, each one 
discarding a possible impediment. Alternatively, a single representation could rule out all 
the indefinitely many possible impediments. This second option was already suggested by 
Whyte (1990, 1997), who proposed attributing a general no-impediments belief to agents. 
The problems I will discuss in this section affect equally both versions of the idea, so I do 
not need to choose one way of developing it.
Remember that I am assuming that the number of possible impediments for an action 
is in general indefinitely large; if this is so, the required no-obstacle representations will 
6 Dokic and Engel further argue that these perceptions of affordances, when accurate, are capable of jus-
tifying an implicit instrumental belief to the effect that the agent will be successful if she performs a 
certain action (2003, 68). However, this claim fails prey to the objection I have presented in the pre-
vious section: such instrumental beliefs would only be justifiable —and thereby implicit in Dokic and 
Engel’s sense— in cases of accurate perception, that is, when there are actually no obstacles. What is 
needed is implicit instrumental beliefs in cases when obstacles are present. 
7 A further way of motivating this possibility would be to take seriously a Bayesian picture of the mind 
in which the agent’s priors represent the absence of obstacles and interferences. 
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 5-22
 Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics 11
need to rule out such an indefinitely large number of possible impediments. Under this as-
sumption, the success-conditions of an action would give us information about the truth-
conditions of a set composed by the agent’s explicit beliefs plus an indefinitely large number 
of no-obstacle conditions.
The problem is that it is not clear how feasible it is to detach the truth-conditions of an 
individual belief from the truth-conditions of this sort of set. On the face of it, one could 
just contrast the success-conditions of different actions elicited by sets of representations 
that share the individual belief one is interested in. This is the sort of strategy typically em-
ployed in order to address the problem of detaching the contribution of collateral beliefs 
to the success-conditions of actions (as I discussed in section 2), and it seems promising 
enough when the number of collateral representations is finite and manageable. However, 
the prospects of this strategy are more doubtful when it is generalized to deal with no-ob-
stacle representations, given that the number of no-obstacle conditions for each action is 
in principle indefinitely large. No matter how many different sets of representations (in-
volving the individual belief in question) are contrasted, it seems that it is never guaranteed 
that there are no further common no-obstacle conditions shared by all such sets. Thus, it is 
not clear that it is possible to effectively detach the truth-conditions of an individual belief 
from all the no-obstacle conditions necessary for the success of the actions elicited by such 
a belief—especially if we take into account that in general the agent’s dispositions to act on 
the basis of some belief will be finite and will not suffice to detach every no-obstacle condi-
tion.
Consider my belief that the water in the pot is boiling. If this belief is true, then it 
seems that my action of cooking fresh pasta in the pot will succeed. However, this action 
may fail despite such a belief being true: perhaps the pasta is rotten, preventing it from get-
ting properly cooked. Thus, the success conditions of my action of cooking pasta in the pot 
are not just that the water in the pot is boiling, but also that the pasta is not rotten (and 
possibly further conditions). In order to factor out this no-obstacle condition, I may con-
sider other actions derived from my belief and whose success would not be threatened by 
the pasta being rotten. For instance, I can use the boiling water to calibrate my thermome-
ter to 100°C. This action would be successful even if the pasta is rotten. In turn, there seem 
to be obstacles for this second action that do not hinder the success of the original action of 
cooking pasta. Think of the presence of salt in the water. If there is enough salt, the water’s 
boiling temperature will raise and I will fail to (accurately) calibrate the thermometer to 
100°C; however, salty boiling water may still be perfectly suitable for cooking pasta.8
So, by contrasting the success-conditions of these two actions, one could hope to be 
able to filter out the contribution of the different no-obstacle conditions and in this way 
detach the truth-conditions of the belief that the water in the pot is boiling. Unfortunately, 
things are not so simple. There may always be further possible obstacles for the two actions 
compared and, in particular, nothing excludes the possibility that there is a common obsta-
cle for both actions. For instance, extremely low pressure will make the temperature of the 
boiling water drop significantly. This would be an obstacle for both the action of cooking 
pasta and the action of measuring 100°C with the thermometer. Of course, there are other 
actions derived from the belief that the water is boiling whose success is compatible with 
8 Seawater, which may be used to cook pasta, typically boils around 100.5 °C.
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extremely low pressures. But there may be further common possible obstacles, more or less 
convoluted, far-fetched and difficult to anticipate—for instance, someone could knock 
over the pot one second after the pasta or the thermometer are introduced in it, frustrating 
both the cooking of the pasta and the calibration of the thermometer. If fanciful possibili-
ties are allowed, it seems that we can always concoct obstacles hindering all the actions that 
the agent is disposed to perform on the basis of the relevant belief (but not affecting other 
actions) —say, a wizard could cast a spell that thwarts precisely those actions.
So, no matter how many alternative actions are considered, it is always possible that 
there are some further no-obstacle conditions that have not been factored out yet—and 
that will therefore muddle the assignation of truth-conditions to the belief we are inter-
ested in. One would never finish detaching the success-conditions associated with all the 
different possible obstacles for each action.9 This problem would be especially pressing for 
agents with a limited repertoire of actions derivable from a given mental representation. 
Plausibly, young children or animals will only be disposed to use their mental representa-
tions as a guide for a reduced range of actions, which will probably be insufficient for fac-
toring out the contribution of all the no-obstacle conditions required for the success of 
these actions. Note, however, that this problem does not only affect agents with a very lim-
ited set of dispositions to act. Arguably, even more sophisticated agents, like ordinary adult 
human beings, may lack the disposition to perform some of the actions that (given suit-
able goals) may follow from the relevant belief. Perhaps the agent has never considered ei-
ther that action or the relevant possible obstacle. For instance, it could well be that a com-
petent agent in the 11th century could not easily conceive of actions involving chairs in 
the absence of gravity. This does not mean that such an agent could not have specific be-
liefs about chairs. So, there is no guarantee that the actual behavioral dispositions of mature 
agents will suffice to screen out all no-obstacle conditions and thereby determine the truth 
conditions of individual beliefs.
Perhaps some will suggest going beyond the behavioral dispositions that the agent actu-
ally has (or would have if she entertained certain goals), and considered further indefinitely 
many possible actions. The problem here is that it is not clear how one should be guided 
when extending the agent’s behavioral dispositions. Depending on how we proceed with 
such an extension, we will attribute different contents to the agent’s beliefs. The attribu-
tion of content would remain undefined.
Thus, the open-ended possibility of obstacles introduces a far-reaching holism in the 
success-conditions of actions, as a result of which it does not seem possible to resort to such 
success-conditions in order to derive the truth-conditions of specific individual beliefs con-
9 An alternative method for screening out no-obstacle conditions would be to contrast the success-con-
ditions of an action A1 derived from the belief B1 with the success-conditions of actions A* derived 
from other sets of beliefs {B*} not including B1. The idea would be that the truth conditions of B1 cor-
respond only to those parts of the success-conditions of A1 that are not shared by the success-condi-
tions of the other actions (this method is suggested by Brandom 1994). However, this method faces 
similar problems to the strategy I have discussed above. First, no matter how many further actions we 
compare, there may always remain further no-obstacle conditions that are not shared by any of these 
other actions and thereby remain undetached. On top of this, this strategy will wrongly screen out as 
no-obstacle conditions those parts of the truth conditions of B1 that are common with the truth con-
ditions of the beliefs {B*} involved in deriving the other actions A*. 
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tributing to the production of those actions. This seriously undermines success semantics, 
understood as the project of accounting for the truth-conditions of individual beliefs in 
terms of the success-conditions of the actions they produce. At best, the success-conditions 
of actions would allow one to determine the truth-conditions of sets of representations in-
volving an indeterminate number of no-obstacle conditions.
To be clear, the underlying problem is not that agents will rarely be in a position to 
have justified beliefs ruling out far-fetched possible obstacles (for instance, obstacles asso-
ciated with skeptical scenarios). The objection I am focusing on is that the actual set of be-
havioral dispositions associated by a competent agent to a certain belief may be insufficient 
to isolate the truth conditions of the belief. It is not clear that the success conditions of the 
actions that an agent is disposed to base on a given belief always manage to determine the 
specific truth conditions of such a belief, without including as well residual no-obstacle 
conditions. These difficulties put success semantics under a lot of pressure and they should 
certainly be addressed by those who want to vindicate such theories.
There remains the possibility of appealing to the success-conditions of actions in order 
to characterize the truth-conditions of instrumental beliefs, such as the belief ‘That glass af-
fords my drinking from it’. Assume that the truth-conditions of this belief are equivalent 
to those of the claim ‘In the present circumstances, my action of drinking from the glass 
will succeed’, a claim that would be falsified by my failure in drinking from the glass. Then, 
it seems that the success-conditions of my drinking from the glass will coincide with the 
truth-conditions of that instrumental belief. However, it would still be unclear how to get 
from here to the truth-conditions of ordinary, non-instrumental beliefs—such as the belief 
that the glass contains water, or that the water in the glass is hot. The scope of success se-
mantics, therefore, would be rather limited.10
Note that RP would be trivially right for these instrumental representations, given the 
way in which I have defined them. However, the fact that the relation between success-con-
ditions and truth-conditions is analytical for such representations (it is introduced by their 
definition) does not mean that we cannot usefully resort to the relevant success-conditions 
in order to identify the truth-conditions of the corresponding instrumental representation.
More generally, with the addition of a global no-obstacles representation of the form 
‘If B1, B2…Bn, then Ai will be successful’, RP becomes trivially true—in particular, its truth 
does not depend on the specific contents of B1, B2…Bn or on the nature of the action Ai 
(Brandom 1994, 177). Ultimately, a general no-obstacles representation would just state 
that that the action will be successful provided that all the other beliefs it is based on are 
true. Once this sort of no-obstacles representation is introduced, it is automatically guar-
anteed that the truth of the agent’s beliefs (including the no-obstacles representation) suf-
fices for the success of her ensuing action. Brandom and Nanay take this to render RP 
vacuous and uninformative (Brandom 1994, 177; Nanay 2013, 154-155; also Dokic and 
Engel 2003, 65; Daly 2003, 60-62). However, this criticism is too quick (as already noted 
10 Maybe some basic, action-related representations should be characterized as instrumental, for instance 
as detection of Gibsonian affordances (which would specify opportunities for action). It can perhaps be 
argued that the representational capacities of some animals can be properly accounted for in terms of 
such instrumental representations. Note, however, that the project of success semantics is standardly 
conceived as aiming to deliver the truth conditions of non-instrumental, ordinary beliefs (e.g. the be-
lief that it is raining). 
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by Whyte 1997, 86).11 Even if each instance of RP becomes trivially true with the addition 
of the general no-obstacle premise, we can still get information about the truth conditions 
of some target belief by contrasting different instances of RP involving the target belief but 
different actions (as we did with the example of the boiling water). As we have seen, the 
problem for success semantics is not that it becomes vacuous, but rather that the success-
conditions of the relevant actions would not allow one to detach the truth-conditions of 
individual, categorical (i.e. non-instrumental) beliefs from the open-ended list of no-im-
pediment conditions.
In the next sections I critically discuss proposed solutions to the ignored obstacles prob-
lem that depart from standard success semantics. First, I address the version of success seman-
tics defended by Blackburn (2010), who rejects the claim that truth guarantees success and fo-
cuses instead on the idea that truth is necessary for non-accidental success. Second, I examine 
Nanay’s (2013) views, according to which truth is sufficient for raising the probability of suc-
cess (even if it does not guarantee it). I will argue that both proposals are problematic.
4. Blackburn’s Alternative Formulation of the Theory
The sort of holism about success-conditions that I have been discussing also makes trou-
ble for the alternative version of success semantics defended by Blackburn (2010, 181-199), 
even if at first sight Blackburn’s proposal appears to remain unaffected by the issue of un-
foreseen obstacles.
Blackburn denies that truth guarantees success. Instead, he wants to argue that truth is 
a necessary condition for non-accidental cases of success. The idea, roughly, is that the con-
tent of our mental representations can be characterized in terms of the conditions that ex-
plain successful episodes of acting on the basis of such representations—at least, those in-
stances of success that are not due to accidents or sheer luck.
Blackburn’s view is attractive because it seems to avoid the problem of ignored obsta-
cles, by allowing that an action based only on true beliefs may fail if there are interfering 
factors. What Blackburn claims is that, when the action does succeed (not by accident), it 
is because the world actually was as represented by the agent. Blackburn states his proposal 
at the sub-sentential level,12 characterizing the referents of the representational vehicles 
that compose beliefs:
Suppose the presence of ‘a’ is a feature of a vehicle ‘a…’. Then ‘a’ refers to a if and only if ac-
tual and possible actions based upon the vehicle ‘a….’ are typically successful, when they are, at 
least partly because of something about a. (Blackburn 2010, 187)
Although Blackburn’s proposal is interesting, it faces several difficulties. For example, it is 
not clear how one may distinguish typical, non-accidental cases of success, without presup-
11 Whyte’s response to Brandom is in other respects misguided. In particular, he seems to conflate the 
attitude of believing with its content, and takes Brandom to be talking about the former when he is 
clearly referring to the latter (e.g. ‘How could the mere existence of the beliefs which cause A suffice 
for its success?’ Whyte 1997, 85).
12 One of the reasons why Blackburn prefers to formulate his proposal at the sub-sentential level is that 
this makes it easier to deal with seldom (or never) used sentences (2010, 187).
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posing the representational content one is trying to account for (arguably, normal success 
cannot just be seen as statistically prevalent cases of success). I will leave aside these poten-
tial problems and focus instead on whether Blackburn’s proposal is really unaffected by the 
holism introduced by ignored obstacles. I want to argue that, after all, such holism does put 
Blackburn’s version of success semantics under pressure.
As we saw above, when an action succeeds (non-accidentally), it is not only because the 
world actually was as represented by the agent, but also because a series of no-obstacle con-
ditions obtained. At first sight, this does not need to cause too much trouble for Blackburn. 
A given representational vehicle will be typically involved in the production of several ac-
tions, and usually the success of such actions will not be associated with the same no-ob-
stacle conditions. So, it may seem that the referent of the relevant representational vehicle 
can be identified as that condition which remains invariant across cases of (non-acciden-
tal) success for the different actions in whose production the vehicle is involved; Blackburn 
(2010, 188) is optimistic that this will in general be the case. The problem, however, is that 
some no-obstacle conditions may be shared by these different actions. There is no guaran-
tee that, by contrasting different actions, one will eventually reach a core invariant condi-
tion that may be identified with the content of the representational vehicle in question. It 
could always be that some no-obstacle condition (intuitively not part of the content of the 
agent’s representation) remains undetached, as I discussed in the previous section.
Note that these undetached no-obstacle conditions do not need to be shared by all 
other actions not derived from the representation in question.13 Therefore, they cannot be 
factored out simply as those conditions invariantly required for the success of any possible 
action (i.e. for successful agency in general).14
One possible reply on behalf of Blackburn’s theory would be to argue that the content 
of representational vehicles is not determined by all conditions invariant across cases of 
success, but only by those invariant conditions that figure in explanations of such cases of 
success. There may be further no-obstacle conditions that are necessary for success but that, 
nevertheless, are not relevant for explanatory purposes. For instance, in standard explana-
tions of a bird’s success in catching a flying insect, we do not typically appeal in an explicit 
way to the laws of gravitation or the atmospheric conditions that enable the bird’s success.
It is not clear that Blackburn would himself favor this reply. He suggests that one needs 
to consider ‘total explanations’ of the success of actions (2010, 191); and, presumably, ‘to-
tal’ explanations will be exhaustive and include references to enabling, no-obstacle condi-
tions. Be this as it may, the problem with the reply is that whether some consideration is 
explanatorily relevant seems to be highly dependent on the context and in particular on 
the interests of the individuals engaged in the explanatory activity; there does not seem to 
13 Imagine that all the actions performed by a bird on the basis of a representation of a flying insect de-
pend for their success on certain atmospheric conditions. This does not mean that the success of any 
action possibly performed by the bird depends on such atmospheric conditions. Perhaps these condi-
tions are not required for the success of some of the bird’s actions related to other representations (say, 
a representation of worms under water). 
14 This strategy is suggested by some of Blackburn’s remarks: ‘we might wish to stress the differential or 
contrastive nature of explanation, in order to avoid the outcome that we are always referring to the 
presence of oxygen or the continuation of the gravitational field—things that are background general 
conditions of success’ (2010, 191).
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be a systematic, context-independent way of discriminating explanatorily relevant consid-
erations from facts that enable the phenomena explained but that do not need to be men-
tioned in the explanation. For instance, one may be interested in the aerodynamics of the 
flight of some hunting bird and thereby appeal to details about the atmospheric conditions 
when explaining the success of the bird in catching some insect. On a different occasion, 
however, these atmospheric details may remain unmentioned in a nonetheless perfectly 
adequate (although perhaps less complete) explanation of the bird’s success. Likewise, on 
some occasions one will appeal to the specific trajectory of the hunted insect in order to ex-
plain the bird’s success, whereas on other occasions one may explain such success without 
explicitly referring to the insect’s trajectory—even if it could well be that such a trajectory 
is part of what the bird represents when hunting the insect. I remain doubtful that there is 
a principled way of specifying what degree of exhaustiveness should be required from expla-
nations of success determining representational content.
I do not claim to have offered decisive arguments against Blackburn’s proposal. I have 
only tried to give some reasons to think that, despite appearances, the open-ended possibil-
ity of impediments for the success of our actions also ends up being problematic for Black-
burn’s views. It seems that this possibility creates deep difficulties for any recognizable ver-
sion of success semantics.
Indeed, the problems undermining Blackburn’s views are arguably related to simi-
lar difficulties faced by teleosemantic theories. Teleosemantics, as presented by Millikan 
(1984, 1995), can be seen as a sophisticated development of the main insights underpin-
ning Blackburn’s proposal.15 In both theories, the content of representations is given by 
those conditions invariant across normal cases of successful behavior based on such rep-
resentations. The difference between the theories is that, in teleosemantics, normal con-
ditions of success are fixed by the evolutionary history of organisms—they would be the 
conditions that obtained in those cases of success that explain why the representational 
mechanism in question was naturally selected. As happens with Blackburn’s proposal, these 
normal success-conditions will typically include a large number of no-obstacles, enabling 
conditions, and nothing guarantees that there will not remain some such enabling condi-
tions among the invariant success-conditions shared by all actions triggered by a given rep-
resentation (see Davies 2001 for an objection along these lines).
Of course, assessing whether teleosemantics may overcome these difficulties requires a 
much more careful discussion. However, these quick remarks suffice to show how the study 
of success semantics may illuminate our understanding of the limitations of other theories 
with related underlying commitments.
In the next section I discuss how the issue of ignored obstacles undermine as well 
Nanay’s alternative version of success semantics.
5. Nanay’s Proposal
Like Blackburn, Nanay (2013) acknowledges that truth does not guarantee success, and 
he reformulates success semantics accordingly—bringing it back, he thinks, to the spirit of 
15 Papineau’s teleosemantics (1987), by contrast, would be closer to an evolutionary version of standard 
success semantics.
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Ramsey’s original views. Nanay proposes two main amendments to success semantics. First, 
its scope is limited to a specific class of mental representations, which he calls pragmatic 
representations. Second, the truth or correctness of such representations is not taken to 
guarantee success, but only to raise its probability.
Pragmatic representations are, according to Nanay, the immediate antecedents of ac-
tion (2013, 156-159). For my purposes here, what is important is that these represen-
tations elicit and guide actions independently of other representations or beliefs of the 
agent. In this way, the success of the action elicited by a pragmatic representation is not 
affected by the possible incorrectness of surrounding beliefs and representations. By re-
stricting the focus of success semantics to this sort of non-holistic mental representation, 
Nanay avoids the problem of practical failure due to incorrect collateral representations 
(2013, 161-162).
The problem of ignored obstacles is addressed by Nanay by endorsing a probabilistic 
reformulation of RP. He claims that the correctness of a pragmatic representation raises 
the probability of success of the action it elicits, although it is not a sufficient condition for 
it: there is room for failure because of unexpected impediments. For instance, even if I cor-
rectly represent the spatial location of an apple, I may fail to grab it because it is inside an 
invisible crystal urn, or because it explodes when touched. Nevertheless, correctly repre-
senting the location of the apple will raise the probability of my succeeding in grabbing it.
Nanay spells out the idea of probability-raising in terms of conditional probability. 
That the correctness of a pragmatic representation raises the probability of success of the 
action it antecedes means that:
the conditional probability of the success of this action given the correctness of the representa-
tion is higher than the conditional probability of the success of this action given the incorrectness 
of the representation (2013, 160).
The correctness of a given representation raises the probability of success of an action in a 
strong sense if such a raise is independent of the correctness of further collateral representa-
tions, that is, ‘regardless of whatever else goes on in my mind’ (Nanay 2013, 160). By con-
trast, the representation raises the probability of success only in a weak sense if the raise de-
pends on the correctness of collateral representations. It is the strong sense of probability 
raising that is relevant for Nanay’s version of success semantics.
The notion of probability-raising is put to work in Nanay’s specification of the content 
of pragmatic representations. According to Nanay,
the correctness conditions of a pragmatic representation, R, is C if and only if C raises the prob-
ability (in the strong sense) of the success of the action R is the immediate mental antecedent of 
and this action is not the proper part of any other action the success of which R raises the prob-
ability of.16 (2013, 161)
16 The final qualification in this quote has the purpose of zeroing in on the action immediately anteceded 
by the pragmatic representation, rather than on the series of actions that are proper parts of it; for in-
stance, the action of moving towards an apple and touching it are proper parts of my action of grab-
bing it (see Nanay 2013, 161). I will be able to gloss over this subtlety in my discussion. 
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The problem with Nanay’s proposal, I will argue, is that it fails to identify satisfactorily the 
content of pragmatic representations. First, there is a problem of indeterminacy: there are 
several different conditions that would, to some extent at least, raise in a strong sense the 
probability of success of the action in question. So, it is not clear which correctness-condi-
tions should be attributed to a given pragmatic representation. Furthermore, on many oc-
casions, the probability of success of the action would be maximally raised by a condition 
that is not the intuitive correctness-condition of the relevant pragmatic representation.
I will discuss these points in turn, resorting to an example in order to do so. Think of a 
frog catching flying targets with its tongue. In line with the sort of view about agency and 
mental representation endorsed by Nanay, the movement of the frog’s tongue would be 
triggered and guided by pragmatic representations about the spatial location of the flying 
targets (this example should be acceptable for Nanay, since he thinks (2013, 163) that the 
actions of non-linguistic animals are also anteceded by pragmatic representations with cor-
rectness-conditions).17
Let us assume that the frog represents a target as being in a certain position S1 in its 
visual field and that it snaps its tongue aiming at that position.18 One first thing to note is 
that the probability of success of the frog’s shot is raised by several different conditions. In 
particular, the correctness of rather imprecise conditions would suffice to somewhat raise 
the probability of success. Take, for instance, the condition that the target is in the Earth’s 
Northern hemisphere. Assuming that the frog actually is in the Northern hemisphere, the 
probability of success of the frog’s shot is higher if the target is in the Northern hemisphere 
than if it were not (if the target is in the Southern hemisphere, the frog’s strike is doomed 
to failure; if it is in the Northern, there is some chance of success).
Thus, on Nanay’s view, the condition that the target is in the Northern hemisphere 
would seem to be a suitable candidate condition of correctness for the frog’s pragmatic rep-
resentation. But other less imprecise conditions of correctness would also do. Imagine that 
the position S1 towards which the frog actually snaps its tongue is on the right side of its 
visual field. Then, the correctness of the condition that the target is on the right side of the 
frog’s visual field would raise the probability of success of the tongue’s snapping (success is 
more probable if the target is on the right side of the frog’s visual field than if it is on the 
left side).
17 Nothing substantial in my argument hangs on the specific details of the example. Similar points can 
be made in relation to pragmatic representations anteceding other simple actions, such as going over a 
step or catching an approaching ball. 
18 Note that I am imagining a frog that represents the target being in a position S1, so it follows from the 
construction of the example that those are the correctness-conditions of the frog’s representation. My 
objection will be that it is not possible for Nanay to derive such correctness-conditions from the con-
ditions that raise the probability of success of the actions linked with that representation. I take it that 
it is intuitively plausible to assume that this representation would dispose the frog to do things such as 
shooting its tongue towards S1 (of course, the details of the connections between the frog’s represen-
tations and its behavioral dispositions are a matter of scientific study). To be sure, Nanay could just 
claim that this assumption is wrong and that the actual relations between representations and actions 
are those predicted by his theory; however, as we will see, such predictions turn out to be highly coun-
terintuitive. 
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Even worse, some false representations that are close enough to the truth also seem to 
have conditions of correctness that would raise the probability of success of the frog’s ac-
tion. The frog, remember, is aiming its shot at position S1. Consider a representation lo-
cating the target in a position S2 slightly to the right of S1. It seems that the frog’s shot 
would be more likely to succeed on the condition that the target is in S2 than on the con-
dition that it is not there (i.e. on the condition that the target is somewhere else in the uni-
verse). Even if the frog’s shot is aimed at S1, it might deviate slightly to the right—because 
of some small inaccuracy in the frog’s performance of the shot or because some external in-
terference, such as a gust of wind. So, it is not too unlikely that the frog’s tongue will end 
up in S2. Given the condition that the target is in S2, therefore, there is a fair chance that 
the frog’s shot will succeed. By contrast, on the condition that the target is not in S2, the 
frog’s chances of success are slim: the target could be anywhere in the universe (except in 
S2), so the frog is looking for a needle in a (very big) haystack.19 Thus, the target’s being in 
S2 would raise the probability of success of the frog’s shot.
It seems, therefore, that there are an indefinitely large number of different correctness-
conditions that would raise the probabilities of success of the frog’s action, some of them 
incompatible (if the target is in S1 it cannot be in S2). It is not clear which of these con-
ditions should be taken to constitute the representational content of the frog’s pragmatic 
representation, according to Nanay’s proposal.
One could try to say that the right correctness-conditions are the most specific ones 
among the possible alternatives (being in S1 would be more specific than being in the 
Northern hemisphere). But this will not work, since being in S2 is as specific as being in S1 
and both conditions, we have seen, raise the probabilities of success.
Another option is to argue that the appropriate correctness-conditions are those that 
maximally raise the probability of success of the action. I will say that the probability of 
success is maximally raised by the correctness of a certain condition if the conditional prob-
ability of success given the correctness of that condition is higher than the conditional 
probability given the correctness of any other possible condition. This proposal, however, 
also gives wrong results. We have seen that the correctness of representational conditions 
that are less precise than the agent’s actual representation may raise as well the relevant ac-
tion’s probability of success. But it can also be shown that the correctness of conditions 
that are more precise than the agent’s representation may be associated with a higher prob-
ability raise than that yielded by the correctness of the actual representation (i.e. the repre-
sentation that, given the construction of the example, the frog is assumed to have).
Imagine that the frog in our example does not represent the target as being in some 
specific point-like location, but rather has a more imprecise representation that places it 
within a certain broader spatial region S3. Imagine also that, when having such impre-
cise representations, the frog tends to shot its tongue towards the center of the region: it is 
19 Of course, on the condition that the target is not in S2 plus the further condition that it is in S1, the 
probability of success is very high. But this high probability would not depend exclusively on the incor-
rectness of the representation I am considering (i.e. a representation locating the target in S2), but also 
on the correctness of the further condition that the target in S1. Thus, the resulting probability raise 
would be weak, in Nanay’s sense. Notice that the conditions of incorrectness of a representation plac-
ing the target in S2 are not restricted to the target being in S1, but also include that the target is in any 
other position alternative to S2.
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more likely that the frog’s tongue hits this central point (call it S3’) than any other location 
within the region S3.20 In this case, it could well be that the probability of success of the 
frog’s shot is higher on the condition that the target is specifically in position S3’ than on 
the more imprecise condition that the target is somewhere in region S3. Thus, the correct-
ness of the actual representation (i.e. that the target is somewhere within region S3) does 
not need to maximally raise the probability of success of the action it antecedes, because 
such probability raise may be higher on a further, more precise, condition (i.e. that the tar-
get is specifically in location S3’).
It is not only more precise correctness-conditions that can lead to a higher probability 
raise than that associated with the correctness of the actual representation. A higher prob-
ability raise is also produced by the correctness of conditions that rule out the presence of 
obstacles and external interferences. Even if the target is actually in S1, as the frog repre-
sents it to be, the frog may fail to catch it for a number of reasons. For instance, an unfore-
seen gust of wind may deflect the strike of its tongue; or an obstacle (say, a falling leaf) may 
block the frog’s shot. More fancifully, the target may be protected by an invisible screen or 
it may explode when touched. In all these circumstances the frog’s action will fail. Thus, the 
frog’s shot will have a higher probability of success if these disturbing interferences do not 
take place. More precisely, the probability of success of the frog’s shot will be higher on the 
condition that the target is in in S1 plus there are no gusts of wind or falling leaves blocking 
the way (and so on) than merely on the condition that the target is in S1—since this sim-
pler condition is compatible with the presence of different obstacles that would thwart the 
success of the action. So, if we take the content of pragmatic representations to correspond 
to those conditions that maximally raise the probability of success, we will not be able to say 
that the frog’s representation has as its correctness-condition just that the target is in S1; in-
stead, we will have to ascribe to that representation a more complex correctness-condition, 
involving not only that the target is in S1 but also an indefinitely large list of no-obstacle 
conditions. Intuitively, this is not the sort of content that we would attribute to the frog’s 
representation. Anyway, the correctness of representations with these contents would guar-
antee the success of the relevant actions (rather than merely raising its probability). RP, with-
out amendments, would be fulfilled in relation to such representations, so it seems that re-
sorting to probability-raising would not offer an advantage over standard success semantics.
All this seems to confirm that the correctness-conditions of pragmatic representations 
cannot always be identified with those conditions whose correctness maximally raises suc-
cess-probabilities. It remains unclear, therefore, how Nanay may manage to select the right 
correctness-conditions among the different candidates that pass the test of raising the prob-
ability of success of the action anteceded by the relevant representation.
Nanay could try to reply that, in normal circumstances (that is, when interfering fac-
tors do not occur), the correctness of the agent’s pragmatic representation maximally raises 
the probability of success of the action it triggers. This reply, however, seems problematic. 
First, we saw above that even in the absence of impediments and interferences, the prob-
20 Perhaps the frog starts by shooting tentatively at the center of the region where the target is (impre-
cisely) represented to be and, if this fails, it moves to more peripheral points of the region. The exam-
ple could be constructed so that, if the target is in a non-central area of the region, it is pretty unlikely 
that the frog will manage to catch it. 
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ability raise brought by the correctness of the agent’s actual representation can be lower 
than the probability raise associated with the correctness of a more precise condition. Sec-
ond, Nanay would have to offer a principled way of specifying what circumstances count 
as normal (without appealing in circular ways to the content of the representations in 
question).21 Moreover, if such a principled specification of normality were available, then 
it seems that one could just minimally modify RP by saying that truth guarantees success in 
normal circumstances (i.e. when interferences and impediments are absent)—Nanay’s ap-
peal to probability-raising would not be needed.
There are further worries with Nanay’s proposal; for instance, it relies on substantive 
commitments about the representational guidance and control of actions—commitments 
that not everybody may want to take on board. At any rate, even if these further worries are 
left aside, the discussion above should suffice, I think, to make one wary of the prospects of 
Nanay’s proposal as an account of the content of mental representations.
It is interesting to note that the problems faced by Nanay’s proposal are reminiscent of 
analogous difficulties plaguing naturalistic informational theories of content, in particu-
lar those theories that specify the content of a representation as those conditions that show 
the highest probabilistic correlation with the presence of the representation (for critical 
discussion, see Ryder 2009). In general, there will tend to be parallels between the problems 
affecting informational theories (which try to extract the content of representations from 
the conditions that correlate with their accurate tokenings), and success semantics theories 
(which try to extract the content of the representation from the conditions correlated with 
the success of the actions derived from the representation). In both cases, there will be no-
interference conditions that will hinder the detachment of the target truth conditions.
6. Conclusions
Success semantics tries to specify the content of mental representations by appeal to the 
connection between the truth of such representations and the success of the actions guided 
by them. This connection is no doubt a central aspect of intentional agency and, plausibly, 
will play a fundamental role in any satisfactory account of mental representation. However, 
I have offered reasons to remain doubtful that one can exploit this link between accuracy 
and success in order to derive directly the truth-conditions of individual (non-instrumen-
tal) mental representations from the success-conditions of the actions they elicit. In par-
ticular, the open-ended possibility of unforeseen disturbing interferences makes our practi-
cal success dependent on the state of the world in messy, complicated ways – which hinders 
(perhaps insurmountably) the formulation of an adequate theory of representation along 
the lines of success semantics.
21 Dokic and Engels (2003, 66) consider the possibility of characterizing normal contexts in terms of the 
evolutionary history of the agent (which would turn success semantics into a version of teleoseman-
tics). The difficulties faced by this project and related ones are discussed, among others, by Hattiangadi 
(2007), Boghossian (1989), Loewer (1997), Ryder (2009).
 Note that it will not do to define normality in terms of worlds that are similar or close enough to the 
actual one, because there will be cases in which the relevant interferences actually take place in this 
world. 
22 Javier González de Prado Salas
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 5-22
REFERENCES
Blackburn, Simon. 2010. Practical tortoise raising: and other philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Boghossian, Paul. 1989. The rule-following considerations. Mind 98: 507-549.
Brandom, Robert. 1994. Unsuccessful Semantics. Analysis 54 175-178.
Daly, Chris. 2003. Truth and the theory of communication. In Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodri-
guez-Pereyra, eds., Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, 54-67 London: Routledge.
Davies, Paul Sheldon. 2001. The excesses of teleosemantics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 117-137.
Dokic, Jérôme and Pascal Engel. 2003. Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success. London: Routledge.
—. 2005. Ramsey’s Principle Re-situated. In Hallvard Lillehammer and Hugh Mellor, eds., Ramsey’s legacy, 
8-21. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2007. Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Content. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Loewer, Barry. 1997. A guide to naturalizing semantics. In Crispin Wright, Bob Hale and Alexander Miller, 
eds., Ch. 8. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
—. 1995. White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nanay, Bence. 2013. Success Semantics: The Sequel. Philosophical Studies 165: 151-165.
Papineau, David. 1987. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Perry, John. 1993. The Problem of the Essential Indexical, and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Ramsey, Frank. 1927. Facts and Propositions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7: 153-206.
Ryder, Dan. 2009. Problems of representation II: Naturalizing content. In Francisco Garzon and John Sy-
mons, eds., 251-279. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge.
Whyte, Jamie T. 1990. Success Semantics. Analysis 50: 149-157.
—. 1997. Success Again: replies to Brandom and Godfrey-Smith. Analysis 57: 84-88.
JAVIER GONZÁLEZ DE PRADO SALAS obtained his PhD at the University of Southampton in 2016. His main areas 
of research are normativity theory, philosophy of language and epistemology.
ADDRESS: Nova Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA), New University of Lisbon, Faculty of Social and Human 
Sciences (FCSH), Av. de Berna, 26, 1069-061 Lisbon, Portugal. E-mail: jgonzalezdeprado@gmail.com
